Thursday, August 13, 2009

What we were reading one year ago

Morningstar Blogs, 10 August 2008*, reports Jeremy Siegel's views.

The call got off to a quick start, as Siegel opened with a bold prediction, effectively stating that we've seen the market bottom (particularly in financials). In his view, the market reached a "selling climax" on July 15--the day he thinks will be noted as the low point of this cycle. Referencing what many believed to be signs of a "bottom" in mid-March with the whole Bear Stearns debacle, Siegel made what seems to be a very dangerous claim (given the high-level of uncertainty in the markets): "this time around will be different."

... To support his views, Siegel also took a jab at market pessimists who claim that the stock market hardly looks cheap with a P/E on the S&P 500 index's trailing 12 month earnings in the range of 22 to 23 times. Siegel argued that the huge write-downs from financial firms (and General Motors GM, for that matter) have caused a "valuation gap" to open up, and that if you look at operating earnings, you'd see a much different picture--and a P/E closer to 17. He also referenced the past few market bottoms, noting that the trailing 12 month P/E ratios on the reported earnings for the S&P 500 at each of those market bottoms was significantly higher than what we're seeing today. Simply put, he doesn't believe the market is justified in assuming "trough level" earnings on a going forward basis.

Being wrong comes with the territory in this business. "Predictions can be very difficult—especially about the future." —Neils Bohr, although occasionally attributed to these guys.

John Hussman, 11 August 2008, likens himself to a "nervous bunny."

With bonds and utilities deteriorating, stock market internals are becoming unusually hostile. This sort of joint deterioration in interest sensitive securities has often provided important warning of steep subsequent losses, as we observed for example in 1966, 1987, and 1990. While the market is still sustaining something of a relief rally from the lows of a few weeks ago, I've noted that hostile yield trends have a tendency to cut such advances short, even when bearish sentiment and oversold conditions would otherwise invite more sustained bear market rallies.

Paul Tudor Jones, in Alpha magazine, via Harry Newton.

I see the younger generation hampered by the need to understand and rationalize why something should go up or down. Usually, by the time that becomes self-evident, the move is already over. When I got into the business, there was so little information on fundamentals, and what little information one could get was largely imperfect. We learned just to go with the chart. Why work when Mr. Market can do it for you? These days, there are many more deep intellectuals in the business, and that, coupled with the explosion of information on the Internet, creates the illusion that there is an explanation for everything and that the primary task is simply to find that explanation. As a result, technical analysis is at the bottom of the study list for many of the younger generation, particularly since the skill often requires them to close their eyes and trust the price action. The pain of gain is just too overwhelming for all of us to bear!

Today there are young men and women graduating from college who have a tremendous work ethic, but they get lost trying to understand the logic behind a whole variety of market moves. While I’m a staunch advocate of higher education, there is no training — classroom or otherwise — that can prepare for trading the last third of a move, whether it’s the end of a bull market or the end of a bear market. There’s typically no logic to it; irrationality reigns supreme, and no class can teach what to do during that brief, volatile reign. The only way to learn how to trade during that last, exquisite third of a move is to do it, or, more precisely, live it — a sort of baptism by fire. One has to experience both the elation and fear as markets move five and six standard deviations from conventional definitions of value.
"Irrationality reigns supreme." He wasn't talking about 2009, but he could have been.

*Footnote: That's when I read it, despite the archive now showing a date of 18 August. There's a story in there somewhere.

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Mr. Market liked beaten-down stocks in July

This chart divides the universe of the 3000 largest cap U.S. stocks (minus a few that haven't been around for two years) into deciles by their two year total return from July 2007 through June 2009. Stocks that did poorly are to the left, stocks that did well are to the right. The stocks that did best during July are those that did worst during the prior two years.

The relationship is so smooth it's almost hard to believe. But then, if we drill down to the individual stocks, as the scatterplot below shows, the underlying reality is somewhat less orderly.

What stocks are those way to the left that lost 99% of their value over the last two years but still have enough market cap to be in the top 3000? Fannie Mae (FNM), Freddie Mac (FRE) and Ambac Financial Group (ABK).

Monday, August 3, 2009

Asset allocation for August

The Faber timing model has turned bullish on two more asset classes. In July commodities, as measured by the GSCI crossed above their 10-month moving average. So did REITS, as measured by the NAREIT US Total Return index.

Here are August's allocations:

  • U.S. stocks: 20%
  • International stocks (EAFE): 20%
  • Commodities: 20%
  • REITs: 20%
  • Cash: 20%

Of the five asset classes, only Treasuries are still below their 10-month moving average. I am using the 10 Year Treasury Ryan Index for this asset class.

I should note here a source of cognitive dissonance for me. My two favorite analysts are now on opposite sides of the fence. Here is John Hussman in today's market comment:

Momentum-based, trend-following, simplistic thinkers with a speculative bent generally do very well during bubble periods (though not over the full cycle). Such analysts appear to have no reservation about jumping in here, because they assume that there will be no consequences to the overhang of deteriorating mortgage and commercial debt, even when coupled with “trigger events” such as rising unemployment (not to mention a median duration of unemployment that is far in excess of that of previous recessions).